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Applying Stress-Testing On Value at Risk (VaR) Methodologies 
José Manuel Feria Domínguez1, María Dolores Oliver Alfonso2
Abstract
In recent years, Value at Risk (VaR) methodologies, i. e., Parametric VaR, Historical 
Simulation and the Monte Carlo Simulation have experienced spectacular growth within the new 
regulatory framework which is Basle II. Moreover, complementary analyses such a Stress-testing
and Back-testing have also demonstrated their usefulness for financial risk managers. 
In this paper, we develop an empirical Stress-Testing exercise by using two historical sce-
narios of crisis. In particular, we analyze the impact of the 11-S attacks (2001) and the Latin 
America crisis (2002) on the level of risk, previously calculated by different statistical methods. 
Consequently, we have selected a Spanish stock portfolio in order to focus on market risk.
Key words: Stress-Testing, Value at Risk, Market Risk Management. 
I. Introduction 
From a conceptual point of view, Value at Risk (VaR) needs to be defined previously in 
terms of certain parameters (time horizon, level of confidence and currency in reference), as well 
as some theoretical hypotheses. One of them has to do with stability which supposes that the VaR 
estimate is obtained for normal market conditions. This principle implies the exclusion of extreme 
scenarios characterized by high volatility levels that are defined by Jorion (1997) as Event Risk. 
Stress-Testing is a useful tool for financial risk managers because it gives us a clear idea of the 
vulnerability of a defined portfolio. By applying Stress-testing techniques we measure the potential 
loss we could suffer in a hypothetical scenario of crisis.  
In the words of William McDonough, the president of the New York Federal Commission 
Bank,  
“One of the most important functions of Stress-testing is to identify 
hidden vulnerabilities, often the result of hidden assumptions, and make clear 
to trading managers and senior management the consequences of being 
wrong in their assumptions”. 
II. Scenario Analysis 
Broadly speaking, there are different ways to develop the Stress-Testing exercise. Dowd 
(1998) distinguishes three main approaches: 
? Historical Scenarios of Crisis: Scenarios are chosen from historical disasters such as 
the US stock market crash of October 1987, the bond price falls of 1994, the Mexican 
crisis of 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Argentinean crisis of 2001, etc.  
? Stylized Scenarios: Simulations of the effects of some market movements in interest 
rates, exchange rates, stock prices and commodity prices on the portfolio. These 
movements are expressed in terms of both absolute and relative changes. As the De-
rivatives Policy Group (1995) suggests: 
o Parallel yield curve in ±100 basis points. 
o Yield curve shifts of ±25 basis points. 
o Stock index changes of ±10%. 
o Currency changes of ±6%. 
o Volatility changes of ±20%. 
                                                          
1 Profesor Asociado, Finance Department, Pablo de Olavide University, Spain. 
2 Profesora Titular, Finance Department, University of Seville, Spain. 
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? Hypothetical Events: A reflection process in which we have to think about the poten-
tial consequences of certain hypothetical situations such as an earthquake, an interna-
tional war, a terrorist attack, etc. 
Scenario Analysis 
Historical Scenarios of Crisis 
Stylized Scenarios 
Hipothetical Events 
Fig. 1. Types of Scenario Analysis (Dowd, 1998) 
III. Methodological Issues 
Main Assumptions 
In this paper, we want to evaluate the response of Value at Risk methodologies to the 
Stress-testing exercise based on historical scenarios of crisis. The first step is to calculate VaR 
estimates by three alternative methods: Parametric VaR, Historical Simulation and the Monte 
Carlo Simulation. In a second part, we put press on those estimates by introducing both the 
stressed volatility and the correlation observed in two scenarios of crisis; in particular, the impact 
of the 11-S attack in New York (2001) and the Latin American Crisis of July 2002. 
Portfolio  
The selected portfolio consists of five common Spanish stocks, such as: TELEFÓNICA 
(TEF), BBVA (BBVA), BSCH (SAN), ENDESA (ELE), REPSOL (REP). Those shares are the 
blue chips of the Spanish Market and they represent more than 50% of the IBEX-35. 
It is also important to define the initial value of the position (portfolio), as well as the par-
ticular weights of each stock. In that sense, we are going to invest 100.000 € equally divided among 
the shares (Table 1). Moreover, the date used to calculate VaR has been set on 30 August 2002. If we 
want to asses the global position, we only have to multiply respective prices and number of shares. In 
that particular case, we have chosen the same weight for each stock, i. e., 20%. 
Table 1 
Initial position (euros) 
Fecha VeR       
30/08/2002 TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP TOTAL 
N
o
detitulos 2.182 1.653 1.998 2.937 1.504 10.273 
Cotización 9.17 € 12.10 € 10.01 € 6.81 € 13.30 €  
Valor  20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 100.000 € 
Peso 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 
Time Horizon 
In this paper, we have selected a time window from 28 January 2000 to 30 August 2002 
and it consists of 651 days of trading. For this period, we have transformed daily price series into 
logarithmic return series by using the following formula: 
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In other words, our sample data is composed of 650 historical daily returns. Secondly, we 
have calculated the historical volatility for each return series as the following equation illustrates: 
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where ? – sample standard deviation, 
T – total number of observations, 
? – medium return of the series, 
Ri – return of individual asset. 
Finally, in order to build up the stress-testing exercise, we have chosen two historical sce-
narios which are characterized for their respective high level of volatility: 
? 11-S terrorist attacks in New York (2001)
? Brazilian crisis (July 2002). 
The daily volatilities for each particular common stock in our portfolio have been calcu-
lated by using a mobile monthly window (20 days of market trading) as Figure 1 illustrates. We 
also plot (Figure 3) the daily volatility observed for the Spanish Stock Market Index (IBEX-35). 
Both charts reflect how risk, in terms of volatility, increases after these international events occur. 
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Fig. 2. Daily volatility for individual stocks
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Fig. 3. Daily volatility for IBEX-35 
VaR Parameters 
Value at Risk (VaR) indicates the maximum loss which we can incur on a particular time 
horizon with a defined level of confidence. In other words, VaR, as a statistical estimate, requires 
the following parameters: 
? The time horizon will be one day, i.e., we will estimate daily VaR, or DeaR (Daily 
Earnings at Risk). 
? The level of confidence has been set at 95%. 
? The currency used for reporting VaR figures is the Euro. 
Loss Profit
? Value
(position)
Probability
VaR
95% pobability of 
P&L < VaR
5% 
probability 
of loss 
beyond VaR
-C
0
 Fig. 4. VaR Concept 
IV. Stress-Testing On VaR Methodologies 
In general, the basis of the Stress-Testing exercise is to recalculate the Value at Risk es-
timate by using a higher volatility than the observed one for the historical window selected, i.e., 
651 trading days. For this purpose, we have computed the daily volatilities for each scenario of 
crisis. These are presented in Table 2. 
Scenario I Scenario II
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Table 2 
Daily volatility for both scenario of crisis 
Fecha VeR TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP 
30/08/2002 2.82% 1.81% 2.35% 2.52% 2.13% 
Fecha  TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP Escenario I 
11/10/2001 3.31% 1.96% 4.73% 4.90% 3.48% 
Fecha TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP Escenario II 
09/08/2002 5.11% 4.51% 4.99% 5.63% 3.66% 
From an operational point of view, the main problem with Stress-Testing appears when in-
corporating correlation. Empirical evidence1 demonstrates that correlation is not constant over time; 
moreover, it fluctuates in periods of crisis. As Aragonés and Blanco (2000) point out, if we put pres-
sure on correlation coefficients in an arbitrary way, probably, the newly calculated correlation matrix 
will not be positive defined and, as a consequence, its elements will not have internal consistency.  
For this reason, it is strongly recommended not only pressing volatilities up, but also the 
correlation matrix ? .
In practice, once we have calculated the correlation coefficients between pairs of stocks 
using a monthly mobile window, we can select the correlation observed for those days of maxi-
mum volatility levels, which corresponds to 11/10/2001 and 09/08/2002, respectively. From here, 
we have designed both stressed correlation matrices (Tables 3 and 4) whose determinants are posi-
tive: 
0?? . (3) 
Table 3 
Correlation matrix scenario I 
 Matriz de correlación: Escenario I 
 TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP 
TEF 100% 56.82% 66.24% 74.49% 45.88% 
ELE 56.82% 100% 74.07% 73.49% 65.36% 
BBVA 66.24% 74.07% 100% 93.68% 80.05% 
SAN 74.49% 73.49% 93.68% 100% 76.14%
REP 45.88% 65.36% 80.05% 76.14% 100% 
Table 4 
Correlation matrix scenario II 
 Matriz de correlación: Escenario I 
 TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP 
TEF 100% 74.87% 74.39% 76.97% 54.05% 
ELE 74.87% 100% 85.19% 84.50% 69.38% 
BBVA 74.39% 85.19% 100% 89.75% 76.99% 
SAN 76.97% 84.50% 89.75% 100% 59.24%
REP 54.05% 69.38% 76.99% 59.24% 100% 
                                                          
1 Jackson (1996) and Mori, Ohsawa and Shimizu (1996) analysed such phenomena. 
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According to Alexander y Leigh (1997), to ensure that the correlation matrix is positive 
defined, it must comply with the Cholesky mathematical property, that is:  
??? TAA , (4) 
where, 
? – Correlation matrix, 
A – Cholesky matrix, 
TA – Transposed Cholesky matrix. 
We have also verified that stressed correlation matrices can be decomposed into Cholesky 
factors as Tables 5 and 6 illustrate. 
Table 5 
Cholesky matrix scenario I 
Matriz de Cholesky: Escenario I 
TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP 
TEF 100% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
ELE 56.82% 82.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
BBVA 66.24% 44.27% 60.43% 0.00% 0.00% 
SAN 74.49% 37.87% 45.63% 30.57% 0.00%
REP 45.88% 47.75% 47.19% 7.67% 57.70% 
Table 6 
Cholesky matrix scenario II 
Matriz de Cholesky: Escenario II 
TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP 
TEF 100% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
ELE 74.87% 66.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
BBVA 74.39% 44.50% 49.86% 0.00% 0.00% 
SAN 76.97% 40.54% 28.98% 39.90% 0.00%
REP 54.05% 43.61% 34.85% -25.41% 57.58% 
Stress-Testing and Parametric VaR 
Stress-Testing is very easy to apply when dealing with the parametric methodology be-
cause we only have to estimate on 30/08/2002 the stressed VaR for each scenario of crisis as for-
mula 5 indicates: 
*
,
*
6449,1)(
dailyi
Z
istressedVaR ?? ??? ??? , (5)
where 
i? – initial value of the position maintained in stocki (20.000 Euros), 
*
,dailyi
? – daily volatility of the stocki associated to a stressed scenario, 
*Z – depends on the level of confidence; at 95% confidence its value is equal to -1,6449. 
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In Tables 7 and 8 we present the individual VaR estimates associated with both scenarios of 
crisis. We can define a new magnitude which is raw VaR, with the aggregation of individual VaR’s, 
so it give us a global measure of risk without standing diversification benefits. If we want to have a 
more realistic idea of the risk exposure, it is necessary to introduce another estimate, which is diversi-
fied VaR or net VaR. For incorporating diversification effects, we apply the following formula: 
VVVaR Ttportfolio ??? *, ?   (6) 
??
??
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
tn
t
t
VaR
VaR
VaR
V
,
,2
,1
?
: Column vector of dimension (nx1) which represents non diversified indi-
vidual VaR’s. It is calculated from the product of ?? ??? ** ZV? ?tnttT VaRVaRVaRV ,,2,1 ?? : The transposed vector of V is calculated as 
** ?? ??? ZV TT .
Table 7 
Individual VaR scenario I 
Escenario I TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP 
Valor inicial 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 
Volatilidad diaria 3,31% 1,96% 4,73% 4,90% 3,48% 
Z (95%) 1,6449 1,6449 1,6449 1,6449 1,6449 
VeR individual 1.090,37 € 643.24 € 1.555,58 € 1.611,27 € 1.145,17 € 
Table 8 
Individual VaR scenario II 
Escenario II TEF ELE BBVA SAN REP 
Valor inicial 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 20.000 € 
Volatilidad diaria 5.11% 4.51% 4.99% 5.63% 3,66% 
Z (95%) 1,6449 1,6449 1,6449 1,6449 1,6449 
VeR individual 1.681,16 € 1.484,15 € 1.641,65 € 1.853,01 € 1.204,43 € 
In Tables 9 and 10 we have computed the diversified VaR for our portfolio in both 
stressed scenarios. Moreover, we have also calculated another interesting estimate, which is EaR 
(Earning at Risk). It is the maximum gain we can expect with a certain confidence level within a 
selected time period. In particular, we have estimated a 95% percentile. We notice that both fig-
ures, VaR and EaR, coincide because of the underlying assumption of normal distribution. 
Table 9 
Correlated VaR scenario I 
Escenario I Nivel de confianza Horizonte temporal 
VeR correlacionado 5.391,11 € 
EaR correlacionado 5.391,11 € 
95% 1 dia 
Ratio VeR/EaR 100%   
Ratio VeR/Valor de la cartera 5.39%   
Table 10 
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Correlated VaR scenario II 
Escenario II Nivel de confianza Horizonte temporal 
VeR correlacionado 7.061,43 € 
EaR correlacionado 7.061,43 € 
95% 1 dia 
Ratio VeR/EaR 100%   
Ratio VeR/Valor de la cartera 7.06 %   
Stress-Testing and the Monte Carlo Simulation 
The Monte Carlo Simulation is based on the generation of random prices as follows: 
t
tt ePP
??
? ?? ??1 , (7) 
where 
tP  is the simulated price, 
1?tP is the current price of the stock, 
?  is a random variable which is distributed as a normal standardized, i.e., with ?=0 and ? =1,?  is the daily volatility of the stock, 
t is an adjusted factor which transforms daily volatility into wider time horizons. In this 
paper, as VaR is estimated one day hence, its value is equal to one. 
In the case of a portfolio, composed by multiple assets, the previous formula cannot be ap-
plied because it is only valid for a single asset. Therefore, the process of generating random numbers 
is more complex; in other words, the historical correlation between shares should be incorporated in 
such a process. For this reason, and from a methodological point of view, the normal random num-
bers, ? , should be transformed into correlated random numbers, Z, by using the Cholesky Matrix: 
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where  
Z is a vector of transformed normal variables which embodies the historical correlation, ?  is a vector of normal standardized variables, 
*A is the stressed Cholesky Matrix for each scenario of crisis as Tables 5 and 6 show, respectively. 
For simulating 1.000 correlated and stressed prices from current prices (see Table 1) we 
should generate 1.000 Z vectors, as the sub- index i indicates in the following equation: 
i
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,
,
?
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?
?
?
i=1,2.....1.000. (9) 
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Once we have computed the random paths for individual stock prices, we can obtain the 
simulated value for the portfolio by multiplying number of shares and simulated prices. We can 
also calculate the simulated profit and loss distribution as: 
tiss WWLP ??& , (10)
where 
iW is the simulated value for the scenario i,
tW is the current portfolio value on 30 August 2002, which is 100.000 Euros. 
If we put in order each simulated result for the portfolio from low to high, we can directly 
infer both VaR and EaR estimates as 5% and 95% percentiles of that distribution as well as other 
parameters such as standard deviation and media (Tables 11 and 12). 
Table 11 
Monte Carlo Simulation scenario I 
Pérdida máxima -9.315,52 € 
Ganancia máxima 12.602,29 € 
Promedio 118,62 € 
Desviación estándar 3.330,85 € Nivel de confianza Horizonte temporal 
VeR 5.179,94 € 
EaR 5.623,93 € 
95% 1 dia 
Ratio VeR/EaR 92,11% 
Ratio VeR/Valor posición 5.18% 
Table 12 
Monte Carlo Simulation scenario II
Pérdida máxima -14.476,87 € 
Ganancia máxima 14.905,28 € 
Promedio -28,46 € 
Desviación estándar 4.340,78 € Nivel de confianza Horizonte temporal 
VeR 7.032,16 € 
EaR 7.261,98 € 
95% 1 dia 
Ratio VeR/EaR 96,84% 
Ratio VeR/Valor posición 7,03% 
Stress-Testing and Historical Simulation 
To some extent, Stress-Testing appears to be a mechanical process based on increasing 
the volatility and correlation following a certain mathematical formulation. In contrast, when ap-
plying Stress-Testing on a Historical Simulation, this exercise presents a clear difference. In that 
sense, correlation can not be stressed directly because it is incorporated in the historical simulated 
price series. So, the practical implementation goes through the following steps: 
? Selection of two historical windows associated to both scenarios of crisis. In particu-
lar, we have computed the previous 20 days of trading from 11/10/2001 for the first 
scenario, and 20 days of trading from 9/08/2002 for the second one. 
? Computation of historical stock returns for each time window. 
? Generation of historical simulated prices by using the following formula: 
iR
ti ePP ?? , (11) 
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where 
iP is the simulated price for the scenario i,
tP  is the current price of the stock, 
iR  is the historical return 19,....2,1?i .
From this point, the process is identical to that described for the Monte Carlo Simulation. 
In Tables 13 and 14 we sum up all the calculations for each scenario analyzed. 
Table 13 
Historical Simulation scenario I 
VeR correlacionado 4.456,76 € Nivel de confianza Horizonte temporal 
EaR correlacionado 4.540,95 € 
Ratio VeR/EaR 98,15% 
95% 1 dia 
Ratio VeR/Valor posición 4,46% Escenario I 
Table 14 
Historical Simulation scenario II 
VeR correlacionado 5.769,37 € Nivel de confianza Horizonte temporal 
EaR correlacionado 6.858,42 € 
Ratio VeR/EaR 84,12% 
95% 1 dia 
Ratio VeR/Valor posición 5,77% Escenario II 
Finally, we conclude with a comparison among the results of the Stress-Testing as Table 
15 illustrates. 
Table 15 
Summary 
Paramétrico Normal Escenario I Escenario II 
VeR  2.978,38 € 5.397,11 € 7.061,43 € 
EaR 2.978,38 € 5.397,11 € 7.061,43 € 
Ratio VeR/EaR 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
Ratio VeR/Valor posición 2,98% 5,39% 7,06% 
Monte Carlo Normal Escenario I Escenario II 
VeR  2.810,13 € 5.179,94 € 7.032,16 € 
EaR 3.155,87 € 5.623,93 € 7.261,98 € 
Ratio VeR/EaR 89,04% 92,11% 96,84% 
Ratio VeR/Valor posición 2,81% 5,18% 7,03% 
Simulación Histórica Normal Escenario I Escenario II 
VeR  2.817,33 € 4.456,76 € 5.769,37 € 
EaR 2.727,47 € 4.540,95 € 6.858,42 € 
Ratio VeR/EaR 103,29% 98,15% 84,12% 
Ratio VeR/Valor posición 2,82% 4,46% 5,77% 
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V. Conclusions 
After applying Stress-testing on VaR methodologies, the main conclusions obtained from 
Table 15 are as follows: 
1. In general, the Stress-Testing exercise always implies a higher level of risk measured 
in terms of VaR. As Table 15 reflects, VaR figures increase for both stressed scenar-
ios. 
2. The impact of Brazilian crisis (scenario II) in our portfolio is greater than that of the 
11-S terrorist attacks. That is due to the narrow relationship between the Spanish 
firms (BSCH, REPSOL, TELEFÓNICA, BBVA AND ENDESA, whose shares are 
included in the portfolio) and the Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
etc.
3. The response of VaR methodologies to the Stress-Testing exercise is not the same. 
For both scenarios of crisis, Parametric VaR is the most reactive. In contrast, in terms 
of EaR, the Monte Carlo Simulation demonstrates more sensitivity. 
4. From the methodological point of view, we should ensure the internal consistency of 
the Stress-testing exercise. For that reason, we must verify that the Correlation matrix 
is positive defined and, thus can be decomposed into its Cholesky factors. 
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